After William Gosset (1876Gosset ( -1937, the "Student" of Student's t, the best statisticians have distinguished economic (or agronomic or psychological or medical) significance from merely statistical "significance" at conventional levels. A singular exception among the best was Ronald A. Fisher, who argued in the 1920s that statistical significance at the .05 level is a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing a scientific result. After Fisher many economists and some others-but rarely physicists, chemists, and geologists, who seldom use Fisher-significancehave mixed up the two kinds of significance. We have been writing on the matter for some decades, with other critics in medicine, sociology, psychology, and the like. Hoover and Siegler, despite a disdainful rhetoric, agree with the logic of our case. Fisherian "significance," they agree, is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific significance. But they claim that economists already know this and that Fisherian tests can still be used for specification searches. Neither claim seems to be true. Our massive evidence that economists get it wrong appears to hold up. And if rhetorical standards are needed to decide the importance of a coefficient in the scientific conversation, so are they needed when searching for an equation to fit. Fisherian "significance" signifies nearly nothing, and empirical economics as actually practiced is in crisis.
We thank Professors Hoover and Siegler (2008) for their scientific seriousness, responding as none before have to our collective 40 person-years of ruminations on significance testing in economics and in certain other misled sciences. 1 We are glad that someone who actually believes in Fisherian significance has finally come forward to try to defend the status quo of lossfunctionless null-hypothesis significance testing in economics. The many hundreds of comments on the matter we have received since 1983 have on the contrary all agreed with us, in essence or in detail, reluctantly or enthusiastically.
Yet Fisherian significance has not slowed in economics, or anywhere else.
Before Hoover and Siegler we were beginning to think that all our thousands upon thousands of significance-testing econometric colleagues, who presumably do not agree with us, were scientific mice, unwilling to venture a defense. Or that they were merely self-satisfied-after all, they control the journals and the appointments. One eminent econometrican told us with a smirk that he agreed with us, of course, and never used mechanical t-testing in his own work (on this he spoke the truth). But he remained unwilling to teach the McCloskey-Ziliak name a few-they can limit their response to this apparently just awful, irritating woman. An economic historian. Not even at Harvard. And, in case you hadn't heard, a former man.
But after all we agree that something serious is at stake. The stakes could generate a lot of understandable heat. If McCloskey and Ziliak are right-that merely "statistical," Fisherian significance is scientifically meaningless in almost all the cases in which it is presently used, and that economists don't recognize this truth of logic, or act on it-then econometrics is in deep trouble.
Most economists appear to believe that a test at an arbitrary level of Fisherian significance, appropriately generalized to time series or rectangular distributions or whatever, just is empirical economics. The belief frees them from having to bother too much with simulation and accounting and experiment and history and surveys and common observation and all those other methods of confronting the facts. As we have noted in our articles, for example, it frees them from having to provide the units in which their regressed variables are measured. Economists and other misusers of "significance" appear to want to be 6 free from making an "evaluation in any currency" (Fisher 1955, p. 75) . Economic evaluation in particular, as we show in our book, was detested by Fisher. 3 And so-if those idiots Ziliak and McCloskey are right-identifying "empirical economics" with econometrics means that economics as a factual science in deep trouble. If Ziliak and McCloskey are right the division of labor between theorem-proving theory and Fisherian-significance-testing econometrics that Koopmans laid down in 1957 as The Method of Modern Economics, and which Hoover and Siegler so courageously defend, was a mistake. What you were taught in your econometrics courses was a mistake. We economists will need to redo almost all the empirical and theoretical econometrics since Hotelling and Lawrence Klein and Trygve Haavelmo first spoke out loud and bold.
Of course-we note by the way-our assertion that Fisherian significance is simply beside the scientific point is not the only thing wrong with Fisherian procedures. We have tallied more than twenty-two non-Fisherian kinds of non- 3 In most statistical results in economics "what you really want to know," Gosset said in 1937 to Egon Pearson, "is can you [or someone else] make money by it?" Such economism drove Fisher mad. See, for example , Fisher 1925a , Fisher , 1935 , Fisher , 1955 , Fisher , 1956 Hotelling 1927 Hotelling -1939 Hotelling , 1951 Hotelling , 1958 Neyman 1956 Neyman , 1957 Neyman , 1961 Pearson , 1990 Kruskal 1980; McCloskey 1998, chp. 8; Ziliak 2007; and Ziliak and McCloskey 2008, chps. 20-23. 7 sampling error-each kind, from Gosset's "a priori bias from fertility slopes" in agriculture to Deming's "bias of the auspices" in survey questionnaires, causing in most applications far more trouble than Type I error does at, say, the .11 or even .20 level. 4 Hoover and Siegler mention this old and large criticism of Fisherian procedures only once, at the end of their paper, though there they mix it up. The analysis of "real" error was by contrast the heart of the scientific work of Morgenstern and Deming and Gosset himself. we can pretend to shift substantive statements over into a probability space.
Hoover and Siegler say this repeatedly, and think they are refuting our argument. (It's a measure, we suspect, of their evident conviction that we are idiots that they say it so often and with such apparent satisfaction, as if finally that issue is settled.) They declare that Fisherian calculations can provide us with "a measure of the precision of his estimates," or can tell us when a sample "is too small to get a precise estimate," or provide us with "a tool for the assessment of signal strength," or is "of great utility" in allowing us to take whole universes as samples for purposes of measuring "the precision of estimates," or can give us a yes/no answer to whether "the components are too noisily measured to draw firm conclusions," or whether "its signal rises measurably above the noise," or "whether data from possibly different regimes could have been generated by the same model."
No it doesn't. Unless there is a relevant scientific or policy standard for precision or signal strength or firmness or measurability or difference, the scientific job has been left undone. The probability measure spans a so far arbitrary space, and does not on its own tell us, without human judgment, what is large or small. The 5 percent level of significance-buried in the heart of darkness of every canned program in econometrics-is not a relevant scientific standard, because it is unconsidered. A p of .10 or .40 or for that matter .90 may be in the event the scientifically persuasive or the policy-relevant level to choose.
And in any case the precision in a sample may not be the scientific issue at stake.
Usually it is not. Occasionally it is, and in this case a considered level of p together with a consideration of power would be worth calculating. It is never the issue when one wants to know how large an effect is, its oomph.
We realize that since 1927 a growing number of economists-upwards of 95 percent of them by our survey during the 1980s and 1990s-have fervently believed that the so-called test settles "whether" an effect "is there" or not-after which, you see, one can go on to examine the economic significance of the magnitudes. But we-and the numerous other students of statistics who have made the same point-are here to tell the economists that their belief is mistaken.
The sheer probability statement about one or two standard errors is useless, were relieved to discover that at Cornell and Princeton they mix things up, too, and in certain ways worse than do the peasants at Roosevelt or the University of Illinois at Chicago.)
Hoover and Siegler have set themselves the task of denying the obvious.
Their rhetoric, therefore, betrays a certain sweaty desperation.
For example they take the failure of significance-using economists to defend the mixing up of substantive significance and Fisherian significance as evidence that the economists already understand the "uncontroversial" point that the two should not be mixed up. So by analogy, for example, the statistical economists of the 1920s who failed to defend the mixing up of the joint effects of unidentified demand and supply curves may be taken as evidence that the preHolbrook-Working, pre-Cowles economists already understood the "uncontroversial" point that the two curves need identifying restrictions. And likewise before Arnold Zellner the average economist knew how to compute the power function for her posterior estimates of inflation and unemployment, since after all she failed to defend her non-use of power.
Or again, late in the paper Hoover and Siegler assert that "the power of the test is not typically ignored." Their evidence? Power "is a major consideration among specialist econometricians," an assertion not backed by evidence, but one we are willing to stipulate. Then they concede that "it is less frequently discussed by workaday users of econometric methods." That's putting it mildly: four percent of economists in our AER sample "discussed" it, In a footnote they assert that our embarrassing omission of many of the papers in the survey of the AER in 1990s (corrected in The Cult of Significance;
since the sample was large, of course, nothing much changed) is "emblematic" of our disgraceful carelessness in argument. We might reply with similar heat that to call items such as power or magnitude "tangential" to the primary mistake and part of a "hodge-podge" of questions and a source of an (apparently always hopeless) index number problem, all of which anyway are "uncontroversial" and "jejune," is "emblematic" of the quality of their argument.
Also "emblematic" is their distaste for the subjective character of our textual measurement, a distaste articulated at the same time, however, with an admission that, of course, "subjectivity alone does not rule out scientific or reproducible procedures." That's right. One does not have to refer to psychology for cases in point. After all, the unemployment rate is the result of a survey, turning on the subjective matter for instance of whether an activity is In 2004 we invited Hoover and Siegler to sit down with us to discuss the necessarily "subjective" scoring of particular papers, but they declined. They demanded that we write down the 7,000 or so decisions we had made, complete with page and sentence citations. For reasons of the opportunity cost of time we declined. We instead invited them to come to Chicago, where we both live, to examine photocopies of the original articles which we had made and written notes on, January 1980 to December 1999. We offered to sit down with them to discuss the data and the notes. Hoover waxed wroth.
But, we asked mildly, if you want to confute our results, why don't you rescore the 370-odd papers, or even a modest sample of them? 5 The AER articles are in the libraries: so go ahead. They didn't, and haven't, not for any sample size-not for N = 10 (one that McCloskey used in her very first attempt back in 1985 to persuade doubters like Hoover and Siegler that water flows downhill) or N = 369 (our "sample" size after correcting for some missing papers of the 1990s).
It seems to be another case of not applying a standard of argument to ones own procedures that, in the style of the blessed Fisher himself, one so stridently demands others follow.
An electronic version of Hoover and Siegler's paper has been circulating for some years. In a widely read comment on it the RAND economist Kevin
Brancato, who seemed at first glad to see a defense of the conventional wisdom, remarked, "I must say that I'm disappointed in H&S. I don't think H&S have much new to say other than the problem is not as bad as M&Z claim. However, 5 As Kevin Brancato put it, "I was with H&S much of the way in that [empirical] section. . . until they equate the refusal of M&Z to reproduce a representative sample of the now lost paper-to-dataset mappings with a refusal to 'share' them. Edgeworth, 1885 , in contrast to, say, Edgeworth, 1907 . We meant, and said, that even Edgeworth, the very inventor of the disastrously equivocal term "significance," does distinguish between practical and some other significance. When he recommends that a "scientist" might judge a 3 percent difference worth looking into if it "repays the trouble" he is making our point: that the decision to attend or not to attend to a difference of this or that magnitude is itself a human and scientific and often indeed economic decision that cannot be handed over to machinery. A speculator on the foreign exchanges might want one level, a student of the habits of bees and wasps (one of Edgeworth's many hobbies) might want another. This is precisely what R. A.
Fisher and the mechanical tradition down to Hoover and Siegler deny.
To adopt in tone a Hoover-Sieglerism, we find their historical research shallow. They have not actually read, it would appear, more than a very few books and articles on the history of the procedure they are confidently defending. They do not grasp what we have said in all our work since 1983, and now especially in The Cult of Significance, that null hypothesis testing was adopted in many fields because of the rhetorical and political skills of R. A.
Fisher, and was contradicted by most of the people around him in Gower Street.
Gosset tried for years to persuade Fisher to acknowledge "real" error and to accept that a statistical decision is a human decision. In 1926 he explained in a letter to Egon Pearson (1895 Pearson ( -1980 ) that benefit and cost should guide use of his t, and incidentally there in the 1926 letter gave Pearson and eventually Neyman the idea of power which they went on to formalize. 7 Fisher by contrast looked all his life for a qualitative essence, rather in the style of economics up to the 1870s looking for an essence of value, before opportunity cost was made clear. After papers we examined). By then they have thankfully given up the task of denying the obvious-the large overuse of Fisherian significance in economics-and are going after our theoretical objections to substituting fit for importance. Here they get really angry. Noise, they say with even more than their usual heat, can mask a cry for help. The cry of "help" (instead of "kelp"), they say, "may be there or it may not be there. The point is we do not know."
No, the point is that we "know" at a level of significance. The choice of the level depends every time on the cost and benefit, in lives saved or profit gained or scientific persuasions performed. "Clearly," they admit, "if the costs and benefits are sufficiently skewed, we may seek more data." No, not if we must act now on the sample we have. The woman crying "help, help" needs our assistance now, not after we have applied to the National Science Foundation for a grant to buy a good hearing aid (p < .05). True, when we rush to her assistance we may find to our embarrassment that she was only crying "kelp, kelp," in a Hoover and Siegler discuss for many pages the justification for taking a population as an ersatz "sample." In our work we have mentioned the matter incidentally, as still another frailty of Fisherian significance, to which we have not devoted sustained attention (along with, for instance, the frequently noted publication bias in reporting "significance": that too was a side point in our work-though not, by the way, responded to in Hoover and Siegler, and mentioned only once). Ersatz sampling was not our main point. Our main point, you will recall, Hoover and Siegler have long conceded.
But we're willing to discuss the matter. We realize that it would be very convenient if a time series of length N could be taken routinely, without consideration, as a sample of size N. It would be convenient because then, by a happy chance, we could apply all the neat things we know about the mathematics of samples from populations, expressions involving that very N.
It's the usual routine. One suspects that the Haavelmo assumption is being adopted because then sampling theory can be used, not because on sober "puzzling" that we hammer away at t tests but recommend confidence intervals.
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After all, they note, confidence intervals can be derived from the t test-at any rate in the minority of cases in which the econometrician has provided enough information about the fitted coefficient to do so. But that's not the point. The point, as we suggested early and late, is that being forced to think about an interval of the variable in question at least encourages the economist to wonder how big is big. A lone asterisk on the fitted coefficient, which is the usual economic practice, does not.
Their evidence for asserting that it is simply "false" that economists underuse such wondering-provoking confidence intervals is a JSTOR search of 39 economics journals over two decades, producing 1788 entries "indicative of reporting or using confidence intervals." They leave it at that. Gosh: 1788 is big,
No, it isn't, not by a relevant standard. Another scientist in the conversation would not be persuaded, unless she is simply uncritically dazzled by 1788 being "far" from, say, zero.
Here's one relevant standard: the 39 journals were published at a minimum 4 times a year and had perhaps 8 empirical articles in each issue over the 20 years. That's about 25,000 articles, of which 1788 is a mere 7 percent.
And who knows how important the alleged confidence interval was in each paper? Hoover and Siegler do not actually read the articles and apply our questionnaire to the "hits" that a computerized search of JSTOR records. Ask, and we together must consider it. There is no "absolute" standard, of a 5 percent probability of a Type I error, say. You, the serious economic scientist, must decide, in light of the numbers, but not mechanically ruled by the numbers.
That's neither arbitrary nor jejune. It's the scientific conversation.
Similarly, Hoover and Siegler believe they falsify our assertion that physicists and chemists do not use statistical significance-much. We admit that our statement that the physicists, say, never, ever use statistical significance was an overstatement, and we will gladly send Hoover and Siegler each the check for $50 promised in some of our presentations to anyone who could find physicists 32 misusing it. But that a very few physicists make the same theoretical mistake that economists make, using an arbitrary level of t to "assess the quality of the observations relative to the assumed statistical model," does not mean that economists are right to go on ignoring substance in favor of Fisherian routine.
The fact is-look at their useful Table 2 -that economists in the 39 economics journals use "some statistical terminology" over 2 times more than cosmologists and 5 times more than non-cosmologist astronomers and 8 times more than nonastronomical physicists.
Hoover and Siegler admit indeed that the role of significance tests in the physical sciences is "a modest one." That, again, is putting it mildly. Their argument shows again how reluctant Hoover and Siegler are to attend to meaningful magnitudes, preferring instead to stick with the Fisherian routine of on/off tests of "whether" something "exists" or "is accurate." We have not done the empirical work, but wouldn't it be reasonable to suppose that the number of such tests per paper in, say, physics is much lower than in the typical economics There is no non-human standard for the decision. Deciding, judging, concluding are human activities, and not activities, we repeat, that can be turned over to a machine, however nice it is to have the machines in good working order. Some person in the conversation must propose a considered level of fit, constituting a substantively meaningful scientific improvement over some other fit, and must argue the case. She must tell how the size of a variable matters, and must argue.
Fisherian tests in the way they are overwhelming used in economics, or in the exceptionally rare cases that they are so used in physics, do not do anything of the sort. Econometrics must be taken apart and redone from top to bottom, attending now to considered standards of oomph, whether in matters of coefficient size or in matters of fit.
We are not just randomly breaking up the machinery. Hyperplane fitting is lovely and interesting. We, too, are quantitative folk. Numbers are essential for real science. But once the matrices are inverted a human being must judge.
Humans who are good at scientific persuasion, such as the Robert Fogel whom shown, for example, Fisher's testimation has led to the over-diagnosis of adult onset schizophrenia (Cohen 1994) . The null procedure does not in the end change rational minds.
In fact, we have argued, it shouldn't. Card and Krueger (1994) changed some minds about the minimum wage with their sample design and their brilliant exploitation of a natural experiment. They did not change minds with their erroneous and mechanical testimations, signifying nothing.
